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Stackelberg Pricing is Hard to Approximate within 2− ǫ
Parinya Chalermsook ∗ Bundit Laekhanukit † Danupon Nanongkai ‡
Abstract
Stackelberg Pricing Games is a two-level combinatorial pricing problem studied in the Economics,
Operation Research, and Computer Science communities. In this paper, we consider the decade-old
shortest path version of this problem which is the first and most studied problem in this family.
The game is played on a graph (representing a network) consisting of fixed cost edges and pricable
or variable cost edges. The fixed cost edges already have some fixed price (representing the competitor’s
prices). Our task is to choose prices for the variable cost edges. After that, a client will buy the cheapest
path from a node s to a node t, using any combination of fixed cost and variable cost edges. The goal is
to maximize the revenue on variable cost edges.
In this paper, we show that the problem is hard to approximate within 2− ǫ, improving the previous
APX-hardness result by Joret [to appear in Networks]. Our technique combines the existing ideas with a
new insight into the price structure and its relation to the hardness of the instances.
1 Introduction
A newly startup company has just acquired some links in a network. The company wants to sell these links
to a particular client, who will buy a cheapest path from a node s to a node t. However, this company is
not alone in the market: there are other companies already in the market owning some links with some
fixed prices. The goal of this new company is to price its links to maximize its profit, having the complete
knowledge of the network and knowing that the client will buy the cheapest s-t path (which may consist of
links from many companies). Of course, if they price a link too high, the client will switch to other links
and if they price a link too low then they unnecessarily reduce their profit.
This problem is called the Stackelberg Shortest Path Game (STACKSP) and can be defined formally as
follows. We are given a directed graph G = (V,E), a source vertex s and a sink vertex t. The set E of edges
is partitioned into two sets: Ef , the set of fixed cost edges, and Ev, the set of pricable or variable cost edges.
Each edge e in Ef already has some price p(e). Our task is to set a price p(e) to each variable cost edge e.
Once we set the price, the client will buy a shortest path from s to t (i.e., a path P such that ∑e∈P p(e) is
minimized). Our goal is to maximize the profit; i.e., maximize ∑e∈P∩Ev p(e) where P is the path bought
by the client. Throughout, we let m denote the number of variable cost edges. It is usually assumed that if
there are many shortest paths, the client will buy the one that maximizes our profit.
Due to its connection to road network tolling and bilevel programming, there is an enormous effort
in understanding the problem by means of bilevel programming [24, 12, 14, 19, 21, 20, 13, 4], finding
polynomial-time solvable cases [24, 29, 18, 27, 10, 3, 6], solving the problem by heuristics [16, 15], and
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approximating the solution [26, 6, 23, 28]. In this paper, we focus on approximability of this problem. In
this realm, STACKSP is the first and the most studied problem in the growing family of one-follower (i.e.,
one client) Stackelberg network pricing games [26, 6, 23, 28, 2, 8, 9, 5].
The Stackelberg pricing problems belong to the class of two-player two-level optimization problems
which is a subclass of the bilevel linear programming. These problems have a rather strange structure,
and this makes the standard approximation techniques such as linear programming seemingly inapplicable.
For example, a natural LP formulation for STACKSP (and also another version called STACKMST) has an
integrality gap of Ω(logm). Moreover, by using the most (and probably the only) natural upper bound for
OPT, one cannot obtain approximation factor better than O(logm) [26], so the line of attacks considered
in [26] and [6] cannot be pushed any further.
Proving the hardness of this problem seems to have an equally big obstacle. In fact, the progress on the
hardness side for the family of Stackelberg pricing problems stops at small constant hardness (APX-hardness
in [23, 8] and only NP-hardness in [2]). Moreover, a reduction from Unique Coverage problem [11], which
proved useful for many pricing problems (including STACKSP with multiple followers) apparently does not
apply here. In particular, for STACKSP, only NP-hardness, strong NP-hardness, and APX-hardness (with
a constant as small as 1.001) are shown [24, 26, 23]. In fact, even for approximating the general bilevel
program, only the constant ratio can be ruled out [17, 22].
We believe that an improvement to upper or lower bound of the problem might shed some light on
approximating a larger subclass of bilevel programs, perhaps generating a new set of techniques for attacking
the whole family of Stackelberg problems. (The problem seems to require a new technique due to its bizarre
behavior.)
Our result and techniques In this paper, we give the first result beyond a very small constant hardness:
Theorem 1.1. For any ǫ > 0, it is NP-hard to approximate STACKSP to within a factor of 2− ǫ.
The key insight in obtaining this result comes from exploring the structure of the edge prices which
was not exploited in the previous inapproximability results [24, 26, 23]: The previous results encode the
constraints in the constraint satisfaction problems (Max 3SAT in their cases) using certain gadgets and
glue these gadgets together in a uniform way (i.e., using the same edge price throughout). However, we
study the influence of non-uniform prices to the hardness of the resulting instances. In particular, we study
how the prices of the fixed cost edges affect the hardness of the gadgets and found an optimal price which
strikes a balance between being too high (which could hugely reduce the revenue but is easy to avoid) and
too low (which is likely to be used but do not affect the revenue much). This observation, armed with a
stronger constraint satisfaction problem (i.e., Raz verifier for Max 3SAT(5) ) and a right parameter of price,
leads to a (2 − ǫ)-hardness of approximation. The techniques above are strong enough that the hardness
result is obtained with only a slight modification of the gadgets. However, due to the non-uniformity of
the prices, a more sophisticated analysis is required. In particular, our analysis relies on a technique called
Path Decomposition which breaks the shortest path in the optimal solution into subpaths with manageable
structure. We will be able to get deeper into the intuition after we describe the hardness construction in the
next section.
Related work
STACKSP is first proposed by Lab´be et al. [24] who also derive a bilevel LP formulation of the problem and
prove NP-hardness. On the algorithmic side, Roch et al. present the first, and still the best, approximation
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algorithm which attains O(logm) approximation factor. Another O(logm) approximation algorithm is
obtained by Briest et al, which has a slightly worse approximation guarantee (larger constant in front of
logm term) but is simpler and applicable to a much richer class of Stackelberg pricing problems. Even
though the algorithm of Briest et al. does not rely on the specific problems’ structures, it remains unclear
whether one can exploit a special structure of each problem to improve the approximation ratio.
Another interesting problem in the family of one-follower Stackelberg network games is Stackelberg
Minimum Spanning Trees Game (STACKMST) in which the client aims to buy the minimum spanning tree
instead of the shortest path. Cardinal et al. [8] introduce this problem and prove that it is APX-hard but has
an O(logm) approximation algorithm. Very recently, they consider the special cases of planar and bounded-
treewidth graphs [9] and prove that even in such graph classes, STACKMST remains NP-hard. There are
also many other variations in the family of Stackelberg games, depending on what the client wants to buy.
This includes vertex cover [6, 5], shortest path tree [2], and knapsack [5].
Among the known approximation algorithms, the most universal one is anO((1+ǫ) logm)-approximation
algorithm invented by Briest et al. [6]. This elegant algorithm works on a large class of problems, including
STACKSP and STACKMST and is coupled with a simple analysis. In the same paper, the case of k clients is
also considered. An O((1+ ǫ)(logm+log k))-approximation algorithm is given, and the problem is shown
to be hard to approximate within O(logǫm+ logǫ k) for some large k. Therefore, the gap is almost closed
in the case of many clients while left wide open when k is small (e.g. k is constant, and particularly when
k = 1).
In Economics and Operation Research literature, STACKSP is also known as a tarification problem.
Many special cases are considered and polynomial-time algorithms are given for this problem [24, 29, 18,
27, 10, 3, 6]. It is also sometimes called a bilevel pricing problem due to its connection to the bilevel linear
program. (See a formulation in, e.g., [24].) STACKSP is also heavily studied from this perspective [24, 12,
14, 19, 21, 20, 13, 4]. Approximating a solution of bilevel program to within any constant factor is shown
to be NP-hard [22, 17]. Unfortunately, these reductions do not extend to the family of Stackelberg games
due to specific structures of the constraints used in the reduction of [22, 17]. For more details, we refer the
readers to [28, 13, 17] and references therein.
Remark Recently Briest and Khanna [7] discover a similar result to ours using a different approach. They
show that STACKSP is hard to approximate within a factor of 2− o(1).
Organization Our construction is a reduction from Raz verifier for Max 3SAT(5) . We first give an
overview of Raz verifier in Section 2. We then describe our reduction in Section 3 before we are able to
give more intuition behind the construction and its analysis. This will be done in Section 4. We then show a
formal analysis in Section 5.
2 Raz Verifier
Our reduction uses the Raz verifier for Max 3SAT(5) with ℓ repetitions. We explain this framework in this
section. The given instance of Max 3SAT(5) is a 3CNF formula with n variables and 5n/3 clauses where
each clause contains exactly 3 different literals, and each variable appears in exactly 5 different clauses.
Let ǫ be a constant and let ϕ be an instance of Max 3SAT(5) . Then ϕ is called a YES-INSTANCE if there
is an assignment that satisfies all the clauses, and it is called a NO-INSTANCE if any assignment satisfies at
most (1− ǫ)-fraction of the clauses. The following is a form of the PCP theorem.
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Theorem 2.1. There is a constant ǫ : 0 < ǫ < 1, such that it is NP-hard to distinguish between YES-
INSTANCE and NO-INSTANCE of the Max 3SAT(5) problem.
Raz verifier for Max 3SAT(5) with ℓ repetitions is a two-provers one-round interactive proof system.
The verifier sends one query to each prover simultaneously. The first prover is asked for an assignment
to the variables in the given clauses while the second prover is asked for an assignment of the variables
that satisfies all the given clauses. The verifier will accept the answers if and only if both provers return
consistent assignments. The detailed description of the provers-verifier actions is as follows.
• The verifier first chooses ℓ clauses, say C1, . . . , Cℓ, independently and uniformly at random (with re-
placement). Next, choose one variable in each of these clauses uniformly at random. Let x1, . . . , xℓ
denote the resulting (not necessarily distinct) variables.
• The verifier generates a query q consisting of the indices of C1, C2, . . . , Cℓ and a query q′ consisting of
the indices of x1, x2, . . . , xℓ. The verifier then sends q and q′ to Prover 1 and Prover 2, respectively.
• Prover 1 returns an assignment to all variables associated with clauses C1, C2, . . . , Cℓ.
• Prover 2 returns an assignment to variables x1, x2, . . . , xℓ.
• The verifier reads the assignment received from both provers and accepts if and only if the assignments
are consistent and satisfy C1, C2, . . . , Cℓ.
Intuitively, for the YES-INSTANCE, both provers can ensure that the verifier always accepts by returning
the satisfying assignments to the prover. On the other hand, any provers’ strategy fails with high probability
in the case of NO-INSTANCE. This is an application of the Parallel Repetition Theorem and Theorem 2.1
and can be stated formally as follows.
Theorem 2.2 ( [25, 1]). There exists a universal constant α > 0 (independent of ℓ) such that
• If ϕ is a YES-INSTANCE, then there is a strategy of the provers that makes the verifier accepts with
probability 1.
• If ϕ is a NO-INSTANCE, for any provers’ strategy, the verifier will accept with probability at most 2−αℓ.
In our reduction, we view Raz verifier as the following constraint satisfaction problem. We have two
sets of queries, Q1 and Q2, corresponding to all possible queries sent to Prover 1 and Prover 2, respectively.
That is, Q1 consists of all possible choices of ℓ clauses sent to Prover 1 (hence, |Q1| = (5n/3)ℓ) and Q2
consists of all possible choices of ℓ variables sent to Prover 2 (hence |Q2| = nℓ). For each q ∈ Q1 ∪ Q2,
let A(q) denote the set of all possible answers to q. Notice that |A(q)| = 7ℓ if q ∈ Q1 (since there are 7
ways to satisfy each of the ℓ clauses given to Prover 1) and |A(q)| = 2ℓ if q ∈ Q2 (since there are 2 possible
assignment to each of the ℓ variables given to Prover 2). Denote byA1 andA2 the set of all possible answers
by Prover 1 and Prover 2, respectively.
We denote the set of constraints by Φ. Each constraint in Φ corresponds to a pair (q1, q2) of queries sent
by the verifier. That is, for each random string r of the verifier, there is a constraint (q1, q2) ∈ Q1 × Q2 in
Φ where q1 and q2 are queries sent to Prover 1 and Prover 2 respectively. A constraint (q1, q2) is satisfied
if and only if the assignments to q1 and q2 are consistent. For convenience, we will treat Φ as the set of
all possible random strings, and we denote, for each random string r, the corresponding queries by q1(r)
and q2(r) respectively. Note that each query q ∈ Q1 is associated with 3ℓ constraints in Φ and each query
q′ ∈ Q2 with 5ℓ constraints. Moreover, let M = |Φ|. We have M = (5n)ℓ. The goal of this problem is to
find an assignment f : Q1 → A1,Q2 → A2 that maximizes the number of satisfied constraints in Φ.
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The following corollary can be directly obtained from Theorem 2.2.
Corollary 2.3. If ϕ is a YES-INSTANCE, then there is an assignment to Q1 ∪ Q2 such that all constraints
in Φ are satisfied. Otherwise, no assignment satisfies more than 2−αℓ-fraction of the constraints in Φ.
3 The Reduction
Let ǫ > 0 be a constant from Theorem 1.1. Recall that we want to prove (2− ǫ)-hardness of approximation.
Overview Starting with an instance ϕ of Max 3SAT(5), we first perform the two-prover protocol with
ℓ = ⌈log(3/ǫ)/α⌉ rounds, and we enumerate all possible constraints in Φ. Next we transform Φ to an
instance of the Stackelberg problem in two steps, as follows. In the first step of the reduction, we order the
constraints in Φ to get a (δ, γ)-far sequence (see Section 3.1). In the second step, we convert such sequence
to an instance of the Stackelberg problem, denoted by G, using the construction explained in Section 3.2.
3.1 Obtaining (δ, γ)-far sequence
Definition 3.1. ((δ, γ)-far constraint sequence) Consider a sequence of all possible constraints r1, . . . , rM in
Φ. A constraint ri is said to be δ-far if for every j : i < j ≤ i+ ⌈δM⌉, q1(ri) 6= q1(rj) and q2(ri) 6= q2(rj).
The sequence r1, . . . , rM is said to be (δ, γ)-far if at least (1− γ)-fraction of constraints is δ-far.
We can obtain (δ, γ)-far sequence with the right parameter for our purpose using probabilistic arguments.
Theorem 3.2. For any ℓ ≥ 1, δ > 1/M and γ ≥ (8δ)5ℓ, there is a polynomial-time algorithm A that
outputs a (δ, γ)-far sequence.
Proof. We present a randomized algorithm here. In Appendix, we derandomize it to the desired A by the
method of conditional expectation. Let r1, r2, . . . , rM be the constraints. Let A′ be an algorithm that picks
random a permutation π : [M ] → [M ]. We claim that the sequence rπ(1), . . . , rπ(M) is (δ, γ)-far with
probability at least 1/2.
To prove the above claim, consider each constraint ri. Let J = {j ∈ [M ] : q1(rj) = q1(ri) or q2(rj) =
q2(ri)}. Notice that |J | ≤ 3ℓ +5ℓ < 2 · 5ℓ because there are 3ℓ constraints rj in Φ with q1(rj) = q1(ri) and
5ℓ constraints rj in Φ with q2(rj) = q2(ri). For each such j ∈ J , the probability that |π(i)−π(j)| ≤ ⌈δM⌉
is at most 2δ. By applying the Union bound for all such j ∈ J , the probability that rπ(i) is not δ-far is at
most (4δ)5ℓ ≤ γ/2. The expected number of constraints that are not δ-far is at most γM/2, so by Markov’s
inequality, the sequence is (δ, γ)-far with probability at least 1/2, and the claim follows.
3.2 The Construction
Given a (δ, γ)-far sequence of constraints r1, . . . , rM , we construct an instance of STACKSP as follows.
For each constraint ri, construct a gadget Gi containing source si, destination ti, and a set of intermediate
vertices {uai , vai }a∈A(q1(ri)). There are 2 · 7
ℓ such intermediate vertices (since |A(q1(ri))| = 7ℓ).
Recall that, for each answer a ∈ A(q1(ri)), there exists a unique consistent answer a′ ∈ A(q2(ri)).
In other words, for each a ∈ A(q1(ri)) there exists a unique a′ ∈ A(q2(ri)) such that (a, a′) satisfies the
constraint ri. From now on, we will use πi to denote the function that maps each a ∈ A(q1(ri)) to its
consistent answer a′ ∈ A(q2(ri)). Therefore, each pair of uai , vai corresponds to a pair of possible answer
(a, πi(a)) that satisfies ri.
Edges in each gadget Gi are the following.
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Figure 1: Example of graph G constructed from Max 2SAT (x1∨x2)∧ (x1∨x3) with ℓ = 1 repetition. Each gadget Gi is noted
with the corresponding constraints ri and each variable edge uai vai is noted with the corresponding answer from Prover 1. Note
that the corresponding answer from Prover 2 can be identified easily. (For example, an edge u(10)1 v(10)1 corresponds to assigning
x1 = 1 and x2 = 0. Therefore, Prover 2’s corresponding answer for u(11)1 v
(11)
1 is x1 = 1.) The bigger picture is in Appendix.
• Fixed cost edges: There is a fixed cost edge of cost 1 from si to ti. There are also fixed cost edges of
cost 0 from si to each of uai , and from each of vai to ti.
• Variable cost edges: There is a variable cost edge from uai to vai for each a ∈ A(q1(ri)).
Now we link all the gadgets together. First, for all 1 ≤ i < M , we create a fixed cost edge of cost 0
from ti to si+1. We denote the source of instance s = s1 and the sink t = tM (i.e., we want to buy a shortest
path from s1 to tM ).
Next, we add another set of fixed cost edges, called shortcuts, whose job is to put constraints between
pairs of edges that represent inconsistent assignment. We only have shortcuts between far gadgets. (Gadget
Gi is called a far gadget if its corresponding constraint ri is a δ-far constraint.) Consider any pair of far
constraints ri, rj for i < j such that ri shares a query with rj; i.e., either q1(ri) = q1(rj) or q2(ri) = q2(rj).
If q1(ri) = q1(rj), we add a shortcut from vaii to u
aj
j for every pair of ai ∈ A(q1(ri)) and aj ∈ A(q1(rj))
such that ai 6= aj . For the case when q2(ri) = q2(rj), we add a shortcut from vaii to u
aj
j for every pair of
ai, aj such that πi(ai) 6= πj(aj). We define the cost of this shortcut to be (j − i)/2.
This completes the hardness construction. It is easy to see that the instance size is polynomial (for
completeness, we add the proof in Appendix).
4 Intuition and Overview of the Analysis
Before we move on to the analysis, we explain the intuition behind the hardness construction in the previous
section and the analysis in the next section.
NP-hardness First, let us understand what happens when we apply the construction in Section 3.2 to Raz
verifier’s Φ without applying Algorithm A (cf. Section 3.1) to get a (δ, γ)-far sequence; in other words, the
sequence of constraints is arbitrary.
We use the following example to convey the idea. Consider a Max 2SAT instance with three variables
x1, x2, x3 and two clauses C1 = (x1 ∨ x2) and C2 = (x1 ∨ x3). (For the sake of simplicity, we consider
an instance of Max 2SAT instead of Max 3SAT.) The constraints of the Raz verifier with ℓ = 1 repetition
are r1 = (C1, x1), r2 = (C1, x2), r3 = (C2, x3), and r4 = (C2, x1). If we construct the graph G from the
sequence of constraints r1, r2, r3, r4 according to the construction in Section 3.2 then we will get the graph
G as in Figure 1.
Consider any pricing p and let P be the corresponding shortest path from s to t. We classify the shortcuts
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whose both endpoints are in P into two types, edges that are contained in P and edges that are induced by
P , as follows.
Definition 4.1. We say that P contains an edge e if e is an edge on P , and we say that P induces e if e is
not an edge on P but both end vertices of e are on P . We say that P involves e if P contains or induces e.
Observe that if P involves no shortcuts then we can construct a satisfying assignment from P . For
example, a path s1u(11)1 v
(11)
1 t1s2u
(11)
2 v
(11)
2 t2s3u
(10)
3 v
(10)
3 t3s4u
(10)
4 v
(10)
4 t4 involves no shortcuts and could be
converted to an assignment x1 = 1, x2 = 1 and x3 = 0. Conversely, a satisfying assignment of Φ can also
be converted to a solution (a price function) with respect to which the corresponding shortest path involves
no shortcut edges. Moreover, observe that if P involves no shortcuts then we can get a revenue of M by
setting price of all variable edges to 1 and we always get a revenue less than M otherwise. The following
observation follows: Φ has a satisfying assignment if and only if there is a solution that gives a revenue
of M in the corresponding graph G. This observation, along with the reduction from Max 3SAT, already
lead to the NP-hardness of STACKSP. This is in fact the essential idea used in the previous hardness results
[26, 23].
Beyond NP-hardness To extend the above idea to a constant-hardness, we further observe an effect of
the shortcuts on the revenue. In particular, we observe that if there are many “parts” of the shortest path that
either contain or induce too many shortcuts then the revenue can be essentially at most M/2. To be more
precise, let us first make the following two observations.
First, observe that if P contains shortcuts e1, e2, ..., ek , for some k, with costs c1, c2, ..., ck then we can
collect a revenue of at most M −
∑k
i=1 ci from P . This is because there is a path of length M from s to
t and, for each i, once edge ei with fixed cost ci is used, the revenue on P decreases by ci. For example,
the path P1 = s1u(11)1 v
(11)
1 u
(10)
2 v
(10)
2 t2s3u
(10)
3 v
(10)
3 u
(11)
4 v
(11)
4 t4 contains two shortcuts v111 u102 and v103 u114
of cost of 1/2 each. Therefore, any solution in which such path is the corresponding shortest path gives a
revenue of at most 4− 1/2− 1/2 = 3.
Secondly, consider when P induces a shortcut edge e′ from gadget Gi to gadget Gj with cost c′ and, for
some reason, the edges in the gadgets Gi andGj can have price at most 1 each. Then we can collect a revenue
of roughly M−(j− i)+c′+2. This is because we cannot collect more than c′+2 on the subpath of P from
gadget Gi to gadget Gj . For example, consider a path P2 = s1u(11)1 v
(11)
1 t1s2u
(11)
2 v
(11)
2 t2s3u
(01)
3 v
(01)
3 t3s4u
(01)
4 v
(01)
4 t4
which induces a shortcut v(11)1 u
(01)
4 of cost 1. For a pricing that P2 is the shortest path, we can collect a
revenue of at most 3 for the following reason. First, we can collect at most 1 from edge u(11)1 v
(11)
1 because
edge s1t1 would be used otherwise. Similarly, we can collect at most 1 from edge u(01)4 v
(01)
4 . Moreover, we
can collect at most 1 from u(11)2 v
(11)
2 and u
(01)
3 v
(01)
3 altogether because the shortcut v
(11)
1 u
(01)
4 would be used
otherwise.
In summary, the observations above imply that a shortcut from gadget i to gadget j (either contained or
induced) causes the revenue on the subpath from gadget Gi to gadget Gj to be bounded by (j − i)/2 + 2.
The role of (δ, γ)-far sequence Before we proceed to show the consequence of these observations, we
would like to eliminate the effect of the the constant “+2” in the bound of the revenue above since it will
be an obstacle in the analysis. In particular, to get the factor of 2 hardness, we would like to say that we
can get a revenue of roughly (j − i)/2 and somehow conclude that the graph reduced from NO-INSTANCE
gives a revenue of at most M/2. (Recall that we can get a revenue of M in YES-INSTANCE.) However, the
constant +2 is a problem when j − i is small.
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We eliminate the above effect in a straightforward way: instead of including the shortcuts for every
constraint, we consider only the shortcuts with large cost (j − i)/2. The problem is, when we throw
away some constraints, the constraint satisfaction problem becomes easier, and we should be able to satisfy
more fraction of the constraints. We do not want this to happen. We want to somehow make sure that by
neglecting a particular set of “bad” constraints, the soundness parameter does not grow by much. Roughly
speaking, Section 3.1 shows that we can get the desired properties while the soundness parameter remains
comparatively small. In particular, we lose an additive factor of γ in the soundness parameter. (Please refer
to Section 3.1 for more details.)
Getting 2-approximation hardness Now that we can eliminate the effect of the constant +2, let us see
how we can use the above two observations to conclude the 2-approximation hardness. Intuitively, the two
observations above imply that if the shortest path P involves many shortcuts then the revenue we can collect
on P is essentially at most M/2. To prove this intuitive assertion, we argue in the next section that we can
always decompose P into three types of paths – paths that look like P1, paths that look like P2 and paths that
can be converted to the solution for Φ such that the number of satisfied constraints is equal to the number of
variable cost edges in such paths altogether. This decomposition needs to be carefully designed to maintain
the properties of the three types of paths and will be elaborated in Section 5.3.
Using the above decomposition and the fact that paths of the first two types give a revenue of at most
half of their lengths, we conclude that the revenue is at most M/2 + c where c is the number of edges in
the paths of the third type. Using the fact that Φ is (δ, γ)-far, we conclude that c is at most (γ + ǫ/3)M
where ǫ is the constant as in Theorem 1.1. By considering large enough n (and thus, large enough |Φ|) and
choosing an appropriate value of δ and γ so that c ≤ ǫM , we have that the revenue is at most (1/2 + ǫ)M .
This implies the gap of 2− ǫ, and Theorem 1.1 thus follows. We formalize these ideas in the next section.
5 Analysis
Now we prove Theorem 1.1 using the reduction in Section 3. Recall that ǫ is a constant as in Theorem 1.1
and we let ℓ = ⌈log(3/ǫ)/α⌉ (where α is as in Theorem 2.2), δ = (ǫ/10)5−ℓ and γ = ǫ/3. It follows that
the soundness parameter of the Raz verifier is 2−αℓ ≤ ǫ/3. (I.e., if ϕ is a NO-INSTANCE, then at most ǫ/3
fraction of constraints in Φ can be satisfied.)
In this section, we show that when the size of ϕ (denoted by n) is large enough, the reduction gives a
(2− ǫ)-gap between the case when ϕ is satisfiable and when it is not. In particular, in section 5.1, we show
that if ϕ is satisfiable, then there is a price function that collects a revenue of M . Moreover, in Section 5.2 we
show that if ϕ is not satisfiable and n is large enough, there is no pricing strategy which collects a revenue
of more than (1/2 + ǫ)M . The value of n will be specified in Section 5.2.
5.1 YES-INSTANCE
Let f : Q1 → A1,Q2 → A2 be an assignment that satisfies every constraint in Φ. For gadget Gi corre-
sponding to the variable ri, set price 1 to the edge from uai to vai for a = f(q1(ri)). Other variable cost
edges in Gi are assigned the price of ∞. We now show that we can collect a revenue of M in this case.
Let P be the shortest path on this graph with respect to the above pricing. Notice that path P does not
contain any shortcut since a shortcut only goes between two edges that represent inconsistent assignments.
(I.e., if there is a shortcut from vaii to u
aj
j on P then either ai is not consistent with aj or πi(ai) is not
consistent with πj(aj). Specifically, either q1(ri) = q1(rj) and ai 6= aj , or q2(ri) = q2(rj) and πi(ai) 6=
πj(aj). However, this is impossible since if q1(ri) = q1(rj) then ai = aj = f(q1(ri)) and, similarly, if
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q2(ri) = q2(rj) then πi(ai) = πj(aj) = f(q2(ri)).)
Since the shortcut is not used, the length of P is exactly M . Moreover, observe that the path that uses
all variable edges of price 1 also has length M . This path is a shortest path and gives a total revenue of M .
5.2 NO-INSTANCE
We assume for contradiction that there is a pricing function which collects a revenue of (1/2 + ǫ)M . Let p
be such pricing function and let P be the corresponding shortest path. Our goal is to construct an assignment
that satisfies more than ǫM/3 constraints in Φ. This will contradict the soundness parameter ǫ/3 of the Raz
verifier.
Definition 5.1. A subpath Q ⊆ P is said to be a source-sink subpath of P if it starts at some source si and
ends at some sink tj for i ≤ j. For any source-sink subpath Q, denote by s(Q) and t(Q) the gadget index
to which the source and sink of Q belong respectively.
Now, let Q be any source-sink subpath and let si and tj be its source and sink, respectively. Let S =
{Q1, . . . , Qk} be a set of source-sink subpaths of path Q. We say that S is a source-sink partition of path
Q if s(Q1) = i, t(Qk) = j, and for all p < k, we have t(Qp) + 1 = s(Qp+1).
The following theorem is the key idea to proving the result.
Theorem 5.2 (Path Decomposition). Let p : Ev → R+ ∪ {0} be the optimal pricing of the variable edges
and P be the corresponding shortest path in the graph. Then we can find sets R and R′ such that the
following properties hold.
D1. R ∪R′ is a source-sink partition of P .
D2. The total revenue collected from edges on paths in R′ is at most M/2 + O(1/δ). In other words,∑
e∈Ev∩(
S
P∈R′ P )
p(e) ≤M/2 +O(1/δ).
D3. The price of any variable cost edge in R is at most 1. That is, p(e) ≤ 1 for any e ∈ Ev ∩ (
⋃
P∈R P ).
D4. There is no shortcut between any two variable cost edges in R.
We defer the proof of this theorem to the next section. Meanwhile we show how the theorem implies
that we can construct an assignment that satisfies more than ǫ/3 fraction of the constraints in Φ, thus a
contradiction to the soundness parameter. First, we consider only when n is sufficiently large so that we can
collect at most M/2 + O(1/δ) < M/2 + ǫM/3 from edges in R′ (from Property D2). Consequently, at
least 2ǫM/3 must be collected from edges in R.
Let E′ be the set of all variable cost edges that lie on some paths in R. From Property D3, we have
|E′| ≥ 2ǫM/3. Let F ⊆ E′ be the set of edges in E′ that lie in far gadgets. Recall that we have at most
ǫM/3 gadgets that are not far (after we run an algorithm A in Theorem 3.2), so |F | ≥ ǫM/3.
We are now ready to describe how we get an assignment that satisfies a large fraction of constraints in
Φ. For each edge e ∈ F , edge e can be written as uaii v
ai
i for some gadget i. We assign the answer a for
query q1(ri) and πi(a) for query q2(ri). This assignment satisfies the constraint ri. This process satisfies at
least ǫM/3 constraints corresponding to the edges in F provided that there is no conflict in assignment.
We argue that there is no such conflict since there is no shortcut between the edges in F . I.e., assume
that the above process creates a conflict assignment to the same query q. This means that there are two
constraints ri, rj ∈ Φ for i < j with q = q1(ri) = q1(rj) or q = q2(ri) = q2(rj) and such query q was
assigned different answers ai and aj when processing gadgets i and j. Since both ri and rj are far gadgets,
by construction, there must be a shortcut between two vertices vaii and u
aj
j . This contradicts the fact that
there is no shortcut in R.
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5.3 Proof of Theorem 5.2
Consider any source-sink subpath Q. Since there is a fixed-cost path of length t(Q)− s(Q) + 1 from ss(Q)
to tt(Q), the revenue collected on Q is at most t(Q) − s(Q) + 1, which will be denoted by len(Q). We let
rev(Q) be the revenue collected on subpath Q, i.e. rev(Q) =
∑
e∈Q∩Ev
p(e). First, observe the following
lemma whose proof is simple and is deferred to Appendix.
Lemma 5.3. If S = {Q1, . . . , Qk} is a source-sink partition of Q, then
∑k
j=1 len(Qj) = len(Q).
We now explain the decomposition of the shortest path P (from Theorem 5.2) into several source-sink
subpaths. Each subpath is contained in one of the sets R, S and T . In the end, we let R′ in the Theorem 5.2
equal to T ∪ S . The composition consists of two phases. We next describe each phase and prove the
properties in Theorem 5.2 along the way.
In the first phase, our goal is to make sure that R contains only source-sink subpaths that do not contain
any shortcut. Initially, we set R, S , and T to R = {P}, and S = T = ∅. We then remove the portion of
paths P which contains the shortcut edges and add them to set S . We ensure that paths are always cut into
source-sink subpaths. In particular, we do the following.
Phase 1: Initially, R = {P} and T = S = ∅. While there exists a path P ′ ∈ R that contains a shortcut
edge, do the following. Let vv′ be any shortcut edge. Let si be the last source vertex that appears before v
in P ′ and let tj be the first sink vertex that appears after v′ in P ′. We note that i, j denote the gadget indices
to which the vertices belong. First remove P ′ from R. Denote by Q the source-sink subpath of P ′ from si
to tj . We break P ′ into three (possibly empty) source-sink subpaths Ql, Q, and Qr; (i) Ql starts at s(Q)
and ends at vertex ti−1, (ii) Q starts and ends at si and tj , respectively, and (iii) Qr starts at tj+1 and ends at
t(Q). We then add Q to S and add Ql, Qr back to R.
Consider the set R′ = S ∪ T . We show that, after this phase, the output satisfies properties D1,
D2, and D3. After the second phase, property D4 will be satisfied while other properties remain to hold.
Observe that property D1 holds simply because the way we break path P ′ guarantees that s(Ql) = s(P ′),
t(Ql) + 1 = s(Q), t(Q) + 1 = s(Qr), and t(Qr) = t(P ′). The next two lemmas prove properties D3 and
D2.
Lemma 5.4 (Property D3). After Phase 1, p(e) ≤ 1 for any variable edge e ∈ Ev that belongs to some path
Q in R.
Proof. Since path Q does not contain shortcuts, vertices si and ti lie on Q for all s(Q) ≤ i ≤ t(Q). Recall
that edge e can be written in the form uaj vaj for some j and a ∈ A(q1(ri)). If p(e) > 1, we can obtain a path
shorter than P by using the fixed cost edge sjtj of cost 1 instead of sjuajvaj tj . This contradicts the fact that
P is a shortest path.
Lemma 5.5 (Property D2). After the first phase, the revenue in R′ = S ∪ T is at most M/2 +O(1/δ). In
particular,
∑
Q∈S rev(Q) ≤
1
2
(∑
Q∈S len(Q)
)
+O(1/δ).
Proof. We will need the following claim.
Claim 5.6. For each path Q ∈ S , we have rev(Q) ≤ (len(Q) + 1)/2.
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Proof. Consider path Q ∈ S from si to tj . Recall that there is a path of length len(Q) in G from si to tj ,
so the total cost of Q is at most len(Q). It is, therefore, sufficient to prove that the total cost of the shortcuts
contained in Q is at least (len(Q)− 1)/2. The way we construct paths in S guarantees that path Q must be
of the form
si → u
a1
i1
⇒ va1i1 → u
a2
i2
⇒ va2i2 → . . .⇒ v
aq
iq
→ tj
where i1 = i, iq = j, and edges of the form uaxix ⇒ v
ax
ix
are the variable cost edges, from which we can
collect a revenue. Other edges of the form vaxix → u
ax+1
ix+1
, for 1 ≤ x < q, are shortcuts. Hence the total cost
of shortcuts can be written as a telescopic sum,
∑q−1
x=1
(
ix+1−ix
2
)
= (j − i)/2 = (len(Q)− 1)/2.
By the claim,
∑
Q∈S rev(Q) ≤
∑
Q∈S (len(Q)/2 + 1/2) ≤
1
2
(∑
Q∈S len(Q)
)
+|S|/2. It then suffices
to bound the size of set S by O(1/δ). Notice that each path in S contains at least one shortcut. Recall that,
by the construction (cf. Section 3.2), each shortcut only goes from vai to ua
′
j if |j − i| ≥ δM . Since the
intervals in the set {[s(Q), t(Q)] : Q ∈ S} are disjoint (by definition of source-sink partition), we can have
at most O(1/δ) paths in S .
This completes the description and the proof of Phase 1. Now every path in R contains no shortcut.
In phase 2, our goal is to eliminate the shortcuts between paths in R. (Note that these shortcuts are not
contained in P .) Roughly speaking, we scan the gadgets from left to right and once we find such shortcut,
we move the whole path that induces this shortcut to the set T . The detail is as follows.
Phase 2: Initially, we have R and S from Phase 1, and T = ∅. We proceed in iterations starting from
iteration 1. The description of iteration i is as follows:
• We first check if source si belongs to some path in R. If not, we proceed to iteration i+ 1.
• If si does belong to any path Q in R, we do the following. We check if there is a shortcut (that is not
contained in Q) leaving from some vertex vaii on Q to some vertex u
aj
j on some path Q′ ∈ R. Note that
Q and Q′ may be the same. Let P ′ ⊆ P be the source-sink subpath from si to tj . We first remove from
R and S , all paths Q′′ such that Q′′∩P ′ 6= ∅. Let Ql be the source-sink subpath of Q with s(Ql) = s(Q)
and t(Ql) = s(P ′)− 1. Also, we let Qr be the source-sink subpath of Q′ with s(Qr) = t(P ′) + 1 and
t(Qr) = t(Q
′). We add P ′ to T , and add Ql and Qr back to R.
We now check the properties. Property D1 holds simply because, in each iteration, we remove only
subpaths of what we will add (i.e., we may add paths Q, P ′ and Q′ to R and T and remove only subpaths
of Q ∪ P ′ ∪ Q′). Since paths in R only get chopped off, Lemma 5.4 still holds, and so does property D3.
Properties D4 and D2 follow from the following Lemmas whose proofs are in Appendix.
Lemma 5.7 (Property D4). After Phase 2, there is no shortcut between any two subpaths in R.
Lemma 5.8 (Property D2). ∑Q∈T rev(Q) ≤ 12
(∑
Q∈T len(Q)
)
+O(1/δ).
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APPENDIX
A Derandomization of Algorithm A′ in Theorem 3.2
Now we derandomize A′ to get a deterministic algorithm A by the method of conditional expectation.
Let Y denote the number of constraints that are not δ-far with respect to a random permutation π. For
a fixed permutation π′, let E(π′, I) be the event that π agrees with π′ on set I (i.e., π′(i) = π(i) for all
i ∈ I). Notice that, we can efficiently compute E [Y | E(π′, I)] for any π′ and I where the expectation is
over random permutation π. Therefore, for i = 1, 2, ..., we deterministically pick the value of π′(i) that
maximizes the value of E [Y | E(π′, {1, . . . , i− 1})].
B Construction Size
We first calculate the size of each gadget Gi. There are O(7ℓ) vertices and O(7ℓ) edges for each gadget.
Next, we count the number of shortcuts. For each pair of constraints ri and rj , there are at most O(72ℓ) short-
cuts between their intermediate vertices. Since there are (5n)ℓ gadgets, the graph size is at most O(n)O(ℓ).
Since ℓ =
⌈
log(3/ǫ)
α
⌉
, the construction size is O(n)O(1/ǫ) which is polynomial in n if ǫ is a constant.
C Omitted Proofs from Section 5
C.1 Proof of Lemma 5.3
∑k
j=1 len(Qj) =
∑k
j=1(t(Qj)− s(Qj)+1) = t(Qk)− s(Q1)+1 = t(Q)+1− s(Q) = len(Q) where the
second equality is because t(Qj)+1 = s(Qj+1) for all j ≤ k and the third equality is because t(Qk) = t(Q)
and s(Q1) = s(Q).
C.2 Proof of Lemma 5.7
Notice that once a shortcut leaving gadget i is found, the whole part of gadget i is removed completely from
R. Therefore, after iteration i, there is no shortcut leaving the vertex in P ∩ Gi to other vertices lying on
some path in R. (In fact, the vertex in P ∩Gi is not in any path in R anymore.)
C.3 Proof of Lemma 5.8
Similarly to Claim 5.6, we can also bound the revenue on paths in T as summarized in the following claim
whose proof can be found in Appendix.
Claim C.1. For each path Q ∈ T , we have rev(Q) ≤ 12 len(Q) + 2
Proof. Consider path Q ∈ T from si to tj . Path Q can be written in the form:
si → u
ai
i ⇒ v
ai
i → . . .→ u
aj
j ⇒ v
aj
j → tj.
Note that we do not assume any structure of the path from vaii to u
aj
j . Also, recall that edges u
ai
i v
ai
i and
u
aj
j v
aj
j were in R after Phase 1 and moved to T in Phase 2. Moreover, there is a shortcut edge from v
ai
i to
u
aj
j (which is not in Q).
Now, let Q′ be the subpath of Q from vaii to u
aj
j , and ei, ej be the edges u
ai
i v
ai
i and u
aj
j v
aj
j , respectively.
Then Q = sieiQ′ejtj . The revenue collected on Q comes from edges in Q′ and ei and ej . Since both ei
and ej belonged to some paths in R after Phase 1, we have p(ei) + p(ej) ≤ 2 (cf. Lemma 5.4). Path Q′
13
can collect revenue of at most (j − i)/2 due to the fact that there is a shortcut edge vaii u
aj
j of cost (j − i)/2.
Overall, the revenue on Q is at most (j − i)/2 + 2 < 12 len(Q) + 2.
Since every path Q ∈ T induces some shortcut edges (i.e., there is a shortcut edge between some pairs
of vertices in Q), the length of such path is at least δM . Therefore, |T | ≤ O(1/δ). We apply Claim C.1 for
every path in T and sum them up. This immediately gives the lemma.
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